The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Johnson, Matthew S.; Lavetti, Kurt; Lipsitz, Michael
• 署名单位: Duke University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/736217
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS; wages; search; ENFORCEABILITY; covenants; matter

摘要

We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers' earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are far-reaching: increasing enforceability imposes externalities on workers across state borders, suggesting broad effects on labor market dynamism. We show that enforceability affects wages by reducing outside options and preventing workers from leveraging tight labor markets to increase earnings. We motivate these findings with a model of search and bargaining. Finally, higher NCA enforceability exacerbates gender and racial earnings gaps.