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作者：Bénabou, R; Tirole, J
作者单位：Princeton University; Institute for Advanced Study - USA; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine intrinsic motivation. We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short ru...
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作者：Khan, A; King, RG; Wolman, AL
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Boston University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent, given frictions in the economic environment. Constructing a model with two sets of frictions-costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods-we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles. First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deflation on average. Yet, ...
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作者：Golosov, M; Kocherlakota, N; Tsyvinski, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
摘要：We consider an environment in which agents' skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal for an individual's marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so. This wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income. We also prove that it is Pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation. This lack o...
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作者：Azariadis, C; Lambertini, L
摘要：We characterize competitive equilibria with perfect foresight in a deterministic, three-period pure-exchange overlapping generations economy with perfect information and no commitment to loan contracts. Commitment is replaced by an enforcement mechanism that excludes defaulters from asset markets for one period. For hump-shaped endowment profiles, young individuals face endogenous debt constraints that ration current consumption. Changes in current and future yields affect these constraints, i...
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作者：Albanesi, S; Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ
作者单位：Duke University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Why is inflation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be the absence of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high or low inflation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the inflation...
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作者：Mookherjee, D; Ray, D
作者单位：Boston University; New York University
摘要：When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions, and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality in utility and consumption is inevitable in any steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in investments. However, divisibility (or fineness of occupational structure) has implications for both the multiplicity and Pareto-efficiency of steady states. Indivisibilities generate a continuum of inefficient and efficient steady st...
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作者：Sibert, A
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals' votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incen...
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作者：Das, M; Newey, WK; Vella, F
作者单位：Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); European University Institute
摘要：Sample selection models provide an important way of accounting for economic decisions that combine discrete and continuous choices and of correcting for nonrandom sampling. Nonparametric estimators for these models are developed in this paper. These can be used for estimating shapes and important economic quantities, as in standard nonparametric regression. Endogeneity of regressors of interest is allowed for. Series estimators for these models are developed, which are useful for imposing addi...
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作者：Segal, I
摘要：This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value (e.g. the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i. This contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion, which lets i exclude j's resource but not use it himself, and inclusion, which lets i use j's resource but not exclude j from it. This representation yields a third-difference con...
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作者：Hellwig, MF
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：For a nonexcludable public good with benefit and cost functions independent of the number of participants, this paper studies second-best allocations under Bayesian interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. As the number of participants becomes large, second-best provision levels converge in distribution to first-best levels if the latter are bounded. Second-best provision levels become large in absolute terms but small relative to first-best levels if benefit and cos...
