Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Segal, I
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00251
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 439-460
• 关键词: asset ownership; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; CONTRACTS; firm; Nucleolus

摘要

This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value (e.g. the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i. This contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion, which lets i exclude j's resource but not use it himself, and inclusion, which lets i use j's resource but not exclude j from it. This representation yields a third-difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion, generalizing existing results for specific games. Namely, collusion is profitable [unprofitable] when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced [increased] by other players.