Expectation traps and monetary policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albanesi, S; Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ
• 署名单位: Duke University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00264
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 715-741
• 关键词: money; inflation; credit

摘要

Why is inflation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be the absence of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high or low inflation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the inflation rate is low on average. This analysis suggests that institutions which promote commitment can prevent high inflation episodes from recurring.