Monetary policy committees: Individual and collective reputations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sibert, A
• 署名单位: University of London; Birkbeck University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00260
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 649-665
• 关键词: Discretion; rules

摘要

This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals' votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.