Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bénabou, R; Tirole, J
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Institute for Advanced Study - USA; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00253
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 489-520
• 关键词: incentive contracts; Self-perception; CONSEQUENCES; authority; pay

摘要

A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine intrinsic motivation. We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run, and negative reinforcers in the long run. We also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.