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作者：Coffman, Lucas C.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances...
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作者：Arieli, Amos; Ben-Ami, Yaniv; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：Eye tracking is used to investigate the procedures that participants employ in choosing between two lotteries. Eye movement patterns in problems where the deliberation process is clearly identified are used to substantiate an interpretation of the results. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers rely exclusively upon an expected utility type of calculation. Instead eye patterns indicate that decision makers often compare prizes and probabilities separately. This...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a dating process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium g...
