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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Lin, Charles
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Some individuals vote because they are motivated by a civic duty to do so, whereas others may vote because they wish to appear prosocial to others. This paper proposes a simple framework that captures these motivations, and provides results consistent with findings on turnout, e.g., that turnout is responsive to the expected closeness and importance of an election, to the observability of one's choice to vote, and to social rewards and punishments associated with voting. We study various exten...
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作者：Schummer, James; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle varian...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Duke University; Stanford University
摘要：We study trust, reciprocity, and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. The size of a favor owed may decline over time, following neutral periods. Indeed, a favor-exchange relationship with this feature improves on a simple favor-exchange relationship. In some settings,...
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作者：Coles, Peter; Kushnir, Alexey; Niederle, Muriel
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Zurich; Stanford University
摘要：Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and ...
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作者：Mialon, Hugo M.; Mialon, Sue H.
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：We develop a model of figurative or indirect speech, which may convey a meaning that differs from its literal meaning. The model yields analytical conditions for speech to be figurative in equilibrium and delivers a number of comparative statics results. For instance, it predicts that the likelihood of figurative speech is greater if the benefit to the listener of correctly understanding the speaker is greater. We then apply the model to analyze particular forms of indirect speech, including t...
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作者：Banerjee, Abhijit; Duflo, Esther; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Lafortune, Jeanne
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one's own group or for marrying up. We then estimate actual preferences for caste and other attributes using a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertiseme...
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作者：Bernard, Andrew B.; Redding, Stephen J.; Schott, Peter K.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Yale University
摘要：We develop a method for identifying departures from relative factor price equality that is robust to unobserved variation in factor productivity. We implement this method using data on the relative wage bills of nonproduction and production workers across 170 local labor markets comprising the continental United States for 1972, 1992, and 2007. We find evidence of statistically significant differences in relative wages in all three years. These differences increase in magnitude over time and a...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：University of Essex; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions ge...
