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作者：Danan, Eric; Gajdos, Thibault; Tallon, Jean-Marc
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We provide a generalization of Harsanyi's (1955) aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinemen...
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作者：Fuchs, William
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to accept outside offers.
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching nu, if, for each agent i there exists a matching mu in the set for which mu(i) = nu(i), then nu is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.
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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Cotton, Christopher
作者单位：University of Miami; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the be...
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作者：Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Deb, Joyee; Kundu, Tapas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; New York University; UiT The Arctic University of Tromso
摘要：We study the role of intergroup mobility in the emergence of conflict. Two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources. We allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, which the opposition can accept or reject, and wage conflict. Agents can also switch group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but implies a higher threat of conflict. Our main finding is that the pos...
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作者：Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
作者单位：Yale University; Getulio Vargas Foundation; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：We study the optimal design of trade agreements when governments can renegotiate after the resolution of uncertainty but compensation between them is inefficient. In equilibrium, renegotiation always results in trade liberalization, not protection. The optimal contract may be a property rule or a liability rule. High uncertainty favors liability over property rules, while asymmetries in bargaining power favor property over liability rules. Moreover, optimal property rules are never renegotiate...
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作者：Frenkel, Sivan
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Credit rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers, such as markets for structured assets, these incentives may lead rating agencies to inflate ratings as a strategic tool to form a double reputation. The model extends the existing literature on cheap-talk reputation to the case of two audiences. Our result...
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作者：Ozyurt, Selcuk
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：This paper shows that in a multilateral bargaining setting where the sellers compete a la Bertrand, a range of prices that includes the monopoly price and 0 are compatible with equilibrium, even in the limit where the reputational concerns and frictions vanish. In particular, the incentive of committing to a specific demand, the opportunity of building reputation about inflexibility, and the anxiety of preserving their reputation can tilt players' bargaining power in such a way that being deem...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Yasuda, Yosuke
作者单位：Duke University; Columbia University; University of Osaka
摘要：Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their preference intensities, which entails ex ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism that allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It inherits muc...
