作者：Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En
作者单位：Duke University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to i...
作者：Benjamin, Daniel J.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Under what conditions do distributional preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player's. Each player's preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player's. I identify two key properties of the second-mover's preferences: indifference curves kinked around fair...
作者：Blundell, Richard; Browning, Martin; Cherchye, Laurens; Crawford, Ian; De Rock, Bram; Vermeulen, Frederic
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Oxford; KU Leuven; University of Oxford; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; KU Leuven
摘要：Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for counterfactual demands and Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These i-bounds refine and extend earlier results of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008). We show that their bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) since they do not require transitivity. The new bounds are sharp under the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP). By requiring transitivity they can be used to bound welfare measures. The new bo...
