Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fuchs, William
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130250
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 99-108
• 关键词: performance; incentives; principal; CONTRACTS; FIRMS

摘要

We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to accept outside offers.