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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players' bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez- faire policy-i.e., no cap-is ...
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作者：Langtry, Alastair
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; King's College London
摘要：Keeping up with The Joneses matters. This paper examines a model of reference-dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labor market, social comparisons with coworkers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labor market sortin...
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作者：Sadler, Evan
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people's opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new measure of influence, and I highlight how opinion fluctuations impact influence campaigns. If agents interact less frequently with those holding different opinions, the variance of public opinion decreases. Consequently, a risk-averse planner ...
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作者：Argenziano, Rossella; Gilboa, Itzhak
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the gamx, y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous fo...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privat...
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作者：Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz
作者单位：University of Haifa; Reichman University
摘要：We study the implications of the disclosure regime of ratings on the level of information released to the public. Specifically, we compare mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We analyze a model where the potential issuers are initially endowed with homogeneous soft information about their values before paying to acquire ratings. We find that for every accuracy level of the issuers' initial information, voluntary disclosure results in a more informative equilibrium than mandatory disclosure. Th...
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作者：Chen, Heng; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：Over the past decades the number of news outlets has increased dramatically, but the quality of news products has declined. We propose a model to reconcile these facts where consumers' attention allocation decisions not only depend on but also affect news outlets' quality choices. When competition is intensified by new entries, the informativeness of the news industry rises. Thus, attention is diverted from existing outlets, reducing their incentives to improve news quality, which begets a dow...
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作者：Jungbauer, Thomas; Waldman, Michael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender's service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling ...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts' disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits und...
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作者：Siegel, Ron; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of defendants' private information about their guilt; highlight forces that may underlie certain features of existing systems, such as plea bargaining and binary verdicts and the separation of fact-finding and sentencing; and indicate directions ...
