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作者：Chambolle, Claire; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; AgroParisTech; INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers that supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. We further show that our theory holds when buyer power...
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作者：Fosgerau, Mogens; Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jorgen
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Columbia University; The Santa Fe Institute; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefully to screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria, and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receive different equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment...
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作者：Hafner, Samuel; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Duke University
摘要：We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever production is successful, and workers holding references are hired with certainty in the ensuing period. Compared to a setting without references: the bonus-contract offers are lower, yet the workers' equilibrium effort is higher. Profits and...
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作者：Huangfu, Bingchao; Liu, Heng
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：This paper analyzes information spillover in a multi-good adverse selection model in which a privately informed seller trades two different goods in two different markets. Buyers learn the seller's information from both the market they participate in and the trading outcomes in the other market. We identify a sufficient negative correlation condition under which information spillover reduces efficiency loss. We also discover a novel type of coordination friction that leads to multiple equilibr...
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作者：Petterson, Marco Stenborg; Seim, David; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Uppsala University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the problem of learning about the effect of one market-level variable (e.g., price) on another (e.g., quantity) in the presence of shocks to unobservables (e.g., preferences). We show that economic intuitions about the plausible size of the shocks can be informative about the parameter of interest. We illustrate with a main application to the grain market. (JEL D83, E23, G13, Q11)
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice. Discount factors that display decreasing impatience are characterized through a convexity axiom for investments at fixed interest rates. Then we show that they are equivalent to a geometric average of generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount rates. Finally, they emerge through parimutuel preference aggregation of exponential discount factors. (JEL D15, D61, D91)
