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作者：Bushong, Benjamin; Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan
作者单位：Michigan State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We document a form of attribution bias wherein people wrongly ascribe sensations of positive or negative surprise to the underly-ing disutility of a real-effort task. Participants in our experiments learned from experience about two unfamiliar tasks, one more onerous than the other. We manipulated expectations about which task they would face: some participants were assigned their task by chance, while others knew their assignment in advance. Hours later, we elicited willingness to work again ...
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作者：Gamp, Tobias; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：We study the implications of biased consumer beliefs for search market outcomes in the seminal framework due to Diamond (1971). Biased consumers base their search strategy on a belief function that specifies for any (true) distribution of utility offers in the market a possibly incorrect distribution of utility offers. If biased consumers overestimate the best offer in the market, a novel type of equilibrium may emerge in which firms make exceptionally favorable offers in order to meet biased ...
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作者：Hui, Xiang; Saeedi, Maryam; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Tadelis, Steven
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University; University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Certification of sellers by trusted third parties helps alleviate infor-mation asymmetries in markets, yet little is known about the impact of a certification's threshold on market outcomes. Exploiting a pol-icy change on eBay, we study how a more selective certification threshold affects the distribution of quality and incumbent behav-ior. We develop a stylized model that shows how changes in selec-tivity change the distribution of quality and prices in markets. Using rich data from hundreds ...
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作者：Brown, Zach Y.; Mackay, Alexander
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We document new facts about pricing technology using high-frequency data, and we examine the implications for competition. Some online retailers employ technology that allows for more fre-quent price changes and automated responses to price changes by rivals. Motivated by these facts, we consider a model in which firms can differ in pricing frequency and choose pricing algorithms that are a function of rivals'prices. In competitive (Markov perfect) equi-librium, the introduction of simple pric...
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作者：Liu, Q., I; Sun, Bo
作者单位：Peking University; University of Virginia
摘要：This paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns affect equilibrium contracting and systemic risk-taking. We find that such externalities can generate pay for luck as an equilibrium strategy. In expectation of pay for luck in other firms, tying mana-gerial pay to luck provides insurance to managers against a com-pensation shortfall relative to executive peers. We also show that an effort-inducing mechanism exists: managers have additional incen-tives to exert effort in utilizing ...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We study monopolistic screening when some consumers are data sensitive and incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals infor-mation to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between data-sensitive and classical consumers using privacy mechanisms that consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option. A privacy mechanism is optimal for large privacy costs and leaves classical consumers better off than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. When privacy preferences become pu...
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作者：Espinosa, Francisco; Ray, Debra
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: if it seems too good to be true, it probably is. We consider exten-sions and applications,...
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作者：Ke, T. Tony; Li, Christopher; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Vanderbilt University; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper explores potential inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in a dynamic career concerns context. In a firm-worker relationship, the worker performs public tasks that have trade-offs between pro-ductivity and informativeness. We show that the first-best outcome can be obtained with short-term contracts if the wage can depend on the task choice. This provides an explanation for wage jumps at promotions-the worker is assigned the more productive but less informative task after promotion...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Sontuoso, Alessandro
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart's choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawarenes...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the con-sumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy policy, it collects information by com-mitting to gradually decreasing the level of privacy protection. In the long run consumers lose privacy and receive low payoffs but choose high activity levels. In co...
