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作者：Hermalin, Benjamin E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Charismatic leaders are often desired. At the same time, experience, especially with demagogues, as well as social science studies, raise doubts about such leaders. This paper offers explanations for char-ismatic leadership's mixed report card. It offers insights into why and when charismatic leadership can be effective; which, when, and why certain groups will prefer more to less charismatic leaders; and how being more charismatic can make leaders worse in other dimen-sions, particularly caus...
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作者：Kolb, Aaron; Pease, Marilyn; Sacks, Daniel W.; Quick, Joshua
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private sig-nal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature's canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in envi-ronments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclo-sure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisc...
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作者：Nguyen, Anh; Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her type-defined by the number of lemons that she owns- and which units in her endowments are the lemons (within-type adverse selection). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold lambda*, with types having less (more) than lambda* uni...
