Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hui, Xiang; Saeedi, Maryam; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Tadelis, Steven
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University; University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210179
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 599-626
• 关键词: Adverse selection; moral hazard; reputation evidence; disclosure; platform; returns

摘要

Certification of sellers by trusted third parties helps alleviate infor-mation asymmetries in markets, yet little is known about the impact of a certification's threshold on market outcomes. Exploiting a pol-icy change on eBay, we study how a more selective certification threshold affects the distribution of quality and incumbent behav-ior. We develop a stylized model that shows how changes in selec-tivity change the distribution of quality and prices in markets. Using rich data from hundreds of online categories on eBay.com, we find support for the model's hypotheses. Our results help inform the design of certification selectivity in electronic and other markets.