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作者：DE Corniere, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Oxford
摘要：We study the profitability of bundling by an upstream firm that licenses technologies to downstream competitors and that faces competition for one of its technologies. In an otherwise standard Chicago -style model, the existence of downstream competition can make inefficient bundling profitable. Forcing downstream firms to use an inefficient technology reassures each one that it will face weak competition. This allows the upstream firm to extract more profit through its monopolized technology....
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作者：Chopra, Felix; Falk, Armin; Graeber, Thomas
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Bonn; Harvard University
摘要：Most prosocial decisions involve intertemporal trade-offs. Yet , the timing of prosocial utility fiows is ambiguous and bypassed by most models of other-regarding preferences. We study the behavioral implications of the time structure of prosocial utility , leveraging a conceptual distinction between consequence-dated and choice-dated utility fiows. We conduct a high-stakes donation experiment that comprehensively characterizes discounting behavior in self-other tradeoffs and allows us to iden...
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作者：Cetemen, Doruk; Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Boston University
摘要：We study the exit of duopolists from a stochastically declining market. Firms privately learn about the market conditions from observing the stochastic arrival of customers, while exit decisions are publicly observed. A larger firm is more likely to have customers and hence has better information about the market conditions. We provide sufficient conditions for either the smaller or the larger firm to be the first to exit in the unique equilibrium. Because of observational learning, exiting ma...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena; Yoon, Ji Hee
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：Advances in market -clearing technology for multiple assets and synthetic products present alternative ways to leverage complementarities and substitutabilites in asset payoffs. This paper compares their equilibrium and welfare effects. In competitive markets , either instrument can mimic the efficient design. When traders have price impact , however , synthetic products and market -clearing technology provide separate instruments for impacting markets' performance and can generate synergies o...
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作者：Kranton, Rachel; Mcadams, David
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University
摘要：This paper investigates information quality in a simple model of socially connected information markets. Suppliers' payoffs derive from the fraction of consumers who see their stories. Consumers prefer to share and act only on high-quality information. Quality is endogenous and highest when social connectedness is neither too high nor too low. In highly connected markets, low-quality stories are widely seen, giving suppliers little incentive to invest in quality. Increasing the volume of misin...
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作者：Kibris, Ozgur; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Suleymanov, Elchin
作者单位：Sabanci University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We provide two nested models of random reference -dependent choice in which the reference point is endogenously determined by random processes. Random choice behavior is due to random reference points, even though, from the decision -maker's viewpoint, choices are deterministic. Through a revealed preference exercise, we establish when and how one can identify the reference -dependent preferences and the random reference rule from observed choice data. We also present behavioral postulates tha...
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover's information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are ...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie m.; Rey, Patrick
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Melbourne; Duke University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimal...
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作者：Wang, Tao; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Capital University of Economics & Business; Durham University
摘要：We show that a probability distribution likelihood ratio dominates another distribution if and only if, for every weighted utility function, the former is preferred over the latter. Likewise, a probability distribution hazard rate (or reverse hazard rate) dominates another distribution if and only if, the former is preferred by every optimistic (or pessimistic) decision maker. (JEL D11, D83)
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Rehbinder, Gustav arreskog
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Uppsala University
摘要：We use simulations of a simple learning model to predict cooperation rates in the experimental play of the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We suppose that learning and the game parameters only influence play in the initial round of each supergame, and that after these rounds, play depends only on the outcome of the previous round. We find that our model predicts out -of -sample cooperation at least as well as models with more parameters and harder -to -interpret machine learning algo...
