Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; University of Bremen
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210117
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 232-258
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; Infinitely repeated games; folk theorem; collusion; INFORMATION; equilibria; promises; SHADOW; FUTURE

摘要

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, , where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, , this is sufficient to reach a high and stable cooperation rate. However, , repeated communication is important to maintain a high level of cooperation under imperfect monitoring, , where players face additional uncertainty about the history of play. ( JEL C72, C73, D81, D82, D83) )