Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rees-Jones, Alex; Shorrer, Ran; Tergiman, Chloe
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200407
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-42
• 关键词: Deferred acceptance; admissions; mechanisms; CHOICE; STABILITY; BEHAVIOR; boston

摘要

We present results from three experiments containing incentivized school choice scenarios. In these scenarios, , we vary whether schools' assessments of students are based on a common priority ( inducing correlation in admissions decisions) ) or are based on independent assessments ( eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). ) . The quality of students' application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive safety options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, , and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms. ( JEL C78, C91, D82, I23)