-
作者：Amir, R
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：We consider a discounted stochastic game of common-property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players, bounded one-period extraction capacities, and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition. We show that the infinite-horizon problem has a Markov-stationary (subgame-perfect) equilibrium and that every finite-horizon truncation has a unique Markovian equilibrium, both in consumption functions which are continuous and nondecreasing and have all slopes bounded above by...
-
作者：Milchtaich, I
摘要：A class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described. The payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the same strategy and decreases with that number in a manner which is specific to the particular player. it is shown that each game in this class possesses at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Best-reply paths in which players, one at a time, shift to best-reply strateg...
-
作者：Bensaid, B; GaryBobo, RJ
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We study a game-theoretic model of preplay negotiation with three players, A, B and C. Player A (the leader) can sequentially offer a finite number T of contracts to the other players prior to his (her) choice of an action affecting B and C's payoffs. Contracts simply specify path-dependent transfers between the players. The bargaining procedure is a game in extensive form with perfect and complete information. We compute the subgame perfect equilibria of this game and provide explicit formula...
-
作者：Einy, E; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：It is well known that the core of a convex coalitional game with a finite set of players is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of the game. we extend the definition of a stable set to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and give an example of a convex simple game with a countable set of players which does not have a stable set. But if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, we prove that its core is the unique von Neumann-Mor...
-
作者：Blume, A
摘要：This paper characterizes robust outcomes in sender-receiver games. An equilibrium (a retract) is perturbed message persistent (PMP) if it is the limit (Hausdorff limit) of persistent equilibria(persistent retracts)in perturbed games. In strict common interest games separating equilibria are PMP and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. With partial common interest, there exists a PMP retract which partially separates types and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. Under a rich language...
-
作者：Hamers, H; Suijs, J; Tijs, S; Borm, P
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：The split core is a refinement of the core for sequencing games. The split core arises from a generalization of the equal gain splitting (EGS) rule that is introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). It is pointed out that the split core is the convex hull of permutation-based gain splitting allocations and the EGS allocation is in the barycenter of the split core. Finally, an axiomatic characterization of the split core is provided. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Watts, A
摘要：In an average surplus sharing game, such as a Cournot oligopoly, a group of agents share a production process. Each contributes an amount of input to the process, and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of comparative static analysis. However, general uniqueness results for concave games have restrictive assumptions on preferences and technology; specifically, the conditions needed for uniqueness become more d...
