Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Milchtaich, I
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0027
发表日期：
1996
页码：
111-124
关键词：
摘要：
A class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described. The payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the same strategy and decreases with that number in a manner which is specific to the particular player. it is shown that each game in this class possesses at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Best-reply paths in which players, one at a time, shift to best-reply strategies may be cyclic. But there is always at least one such path that connects an arbitrary initial point to an equilibrium. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.