Convex games and stable sets
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Einy, E; Shitovitz, B
署名单位：
University of Haifa
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0082
发表日期：
1996
页码：
192-201
关键词：
摘要：
It is well known that the core of a convex coalitional game with a finite set of players is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of the game. we extend the definition of a stable set to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and give an example of a convex simple game with a countable set of players which does not have a stable set. But if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, we prove that its core is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. we also show that a game with a countable (possibly finite) set of players which is inner continuous is convex iff the core of each of its subgames is a stable set Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70. C71. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.