Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Amir, R
署名单位：
Dortmund University of Technology
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0061
发表日期：
1996
页码：
111-131
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a discounted stochastic game of common-property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players, bounded one-period extraction capacities, and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition. We show that the infinite-horizon problem has a Markov-stationary (subgame-perfect) equilibrium and that every finite-horizon truncation has a unique Markovian equilibrium, both in consumption functions which are continuous and nondecreasing and have all slopes bounded above by 1. Unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models, these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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