On the uniqueness of equilibrium in cournot oligopoly and other games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Watts, A
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0037
发表日期：
1996
页码：
269-285
关键词：
摘要：
In an average surplus sharing game, such as a Cournot oligopoly, a group of agents share a production process. Each contributes an amount of input to the process, and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of comparative static analysis. However, general uniqueness results for concave games have restrictive assumptions on preferences and technology; specifically, the conditions needed for uniqueness become more difficult to meet as the number of players increases. A new theorem for uniqueness with easily interpretable conditions is given which is independent of the number of players. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.