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作者：Collier, P; Dollar, D
作者单位：University of Oxford; The World Bank
摘要：We suggest that the 'poverty-efficiency' aid allocation is merely a benchmark guide if a donor lacks other information about the country and also the power to change or prevail over government preferences. We argue that in most circumstances donors have only limited scope for the latter and that, while high aid dependence may reduce the fungibility problem and the use of NGOs can by-pass it altogether, such circumstances are not very common. Hence, the main reasons for departing from the bench...
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作者：Haldane, AG; Irwin, G; Saporta, V
作者单位：Bank of England
摘要：This paper assesses various crisis resolution proposals using a theoretical model of liquidity and solvency crisis. The model suggests that payments standstills and last-resort lending are an equally efficient means of dealing with liquidity crises, while coordinated lending through creditor committees is second-best. Debt write-downs are preferred to subsidised IMF financing when dealing with solvency crises, because of the negative moral hazard implications of the latter tool. Finally, the m...
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作者：Dollar, D; Kraay, A
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：A key issue today is the effect of globalisation on inequality and poverty. Well over half the developing world lives in globalising economies that have seen large increases in trade and significant declines in tariffs. They are catching up the rich countries while the rest of the developing world is falling farther behind. Second, we examine the effects on the poor. The increase in growth rates leads on average to proportionate increases in incomes of the poor. The evidence from individual ca...
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作者：Gersovitz, M; Hammer, JS
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; The World Bank
摘要：The structure of representative agents and decentralisation of the social planner's problem provide a framework for the economics of infection and associated externalities. Optimal implementation of prevention and therapy depends on: (1) biology including whether infection is person to person or by vectors; (2) whether the infected progress to recovery and Susceptibility, immunity, or death; (3) costs of interventions; (4) whether interventions target everyone, the uninfected, the infected, or...
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作者：Backhouse, RE
作者单位：University of Birmingham
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作者：Ercolani, M
作者单位：University of Birmingham
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作者：Aghion, P; Schankerman, M
作者单位：Harvard University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyse the welfare effects of policies that intensify product market competition, and the channels through which they operate. Using a circular model of horizontal product differentiation with asymmetric costs, we study the effects of increased price competition on market selection among incumbent firms, cost reduction effort, and entry of new firms. The model also generates an endogenous demand for competition-enhancing or retarding policies arising from cost heterogeneity, and we demonst...
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作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Several contractual situations are such that the parties may 'step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer - employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a 'joint outside option' and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the international trade and theory of the firm are considered in some depth.
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作者：Haucap, J; Wey, C
作者单位：Ruhr University Bochum; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) 'decentralisation' where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) 'coordination' where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms and (3) 'centralisation' where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are lar...
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作者：Garner, P
作者单位：Brigham Young University
