Going alone together: Joint outside options in bilateral negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
• 署名单位: University of London; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00250.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 943-960
• 关键词: perfect equilibrium; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; OWNERSHIP; COSTS

摘要

Several contractual situations are such that the parties may 'step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer - employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a 'joint outside option' and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the international trade and theory of the firm are considered in some depth.