Unionisation structures and innovation incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haucap, J; Wey, C
• 署名单位: Ruhr University Bochum; Technical University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0013-0133.2004.00203.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: C149-C165
• 关键词: wage-setting institutions; labor-market rigidities; trade-unions; unemployment; flexibility; INVESTMENT; CONTRACTS; binding; Europe

摘要

This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) 'decentralisation' where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) 'coordination' where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms and (3) 'centralisation' where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are largest under 'centralisation', investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralisation: 'decentralisation' carries higher investment incentives than 'coordination'. Labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non-discrimination rules.