The economical control of infectious diseases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gersovitz, M; Hammer, JS
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.0174.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: models

摘要

The structure of representative agents and decentralisation of the social planner's problem provide a framework for the economics of infection and associated externalities. Optimal implementation of prevention and therapy depends on: (1) biology including whether infection is person to person or by vectors; (2) whether the infected progress to recovery and Susceptibility, immunity, or death; (3) costs of interventions; (4) whether interventions target everyone, the uninfected, the infected, or contacts between the two; (5) individual behaviour leading to two types of externalities. By way of example, if people recover to be susceptible, government subsidies should equally favour prevention and therapy.