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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Columbia University; Columbia University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The storable votes mechanism is a voting method for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the sequence of decisions. This provides incentives for voters to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them more, typically generating welfare gains over standard majority voting with non-storable votes. Equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive feature-the number of votes cas...
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作者：Moulin, H; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We propose two cost-sharing theories in which agents demand comparable commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility, agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same quantity pay the same price; this holds under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand-alone cost under full responsibility; this holds under partial res...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：New York University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The well-being of agents is often directly affected by their beliefs, in the form of anticipatory feelings such as anxiety and hopefulness. Economists have tried to model this effect by introducing beliefs as arguments in decision makers' vNM utility function. One might expect that such a model would be capable of explaining anomalous attitudes to information that we observe in reality. We show that the model has several shortcomings in this regard, as long as Bayesian updating is retained. (c...
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作者：Dubey, P; Haimanko, O; Zapechelnyuk, A
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are pseudopotential games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
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作者：Arifovic, Jasmina; McKelvey, Richard D.; Pevnitskaya, Svetlana
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We report on a design of a Turing tournament and its initial implementation to learning in repeated 2-person games. The principal objectives of the tournament, named after the original Turing Test, are (1) to find teaming algorithms (emulators) that most closely simulate human behavior, (2) to find algorithms (detectors) that most accurately distinguish between humans and machines, and (3) to provide a demonstration of how to implement this methodology for evaluating models of human behavior. ...
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作者：Dellis, A; Oak, MP
作者单位：Williams College; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：We present a formal model of political competition under approval voting which allows for endogenous candidate entry. Our analysis yields a number of novel insights. First, we develop a notion of sincere voting behavior under approval voting, called relative sincerity. We then show that the relatively sincere voting behavior is consistent with the strategic calculus of voting. Second, we show that in a one-dimensional model with distance preferences, equilibria in relatively sincere strategies...
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作者：McKelvey, Richard D.; Patty, John W.
作者单位：Harvard University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters' strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters' ut...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of London; University College London
摘要：We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by another pure strategy such that the former survives along most solutions of the Brown-von Neurnann-Nash dynamics. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kaminski, MM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex characteristics, or types. When types are single positive numbers (agents' claims), Young's theorem says that in the presence of continuity, a method of rationing is consistent and symmetric if and only if it can be represented by a continuous parametric function. This theorem is generalized to all separable type spaces. Related results include a characterization of non-continuous parametric metho...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Bevia, Carmen
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them...
