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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
摘要：Theories of focal points typically assume that games are accompanied by labelings or frames that relate the actions in the game to the environment in which the game is played. Attention then focuses on how players can exploit framing information to identify focal equilibria. This paper asks instead how evolutionary considerations determine which aspects of the environment are likely to be monitored by the players and hence appear as part of the framing information. Efficient monitoring turns o...
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作者：Lebrun, B
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：If the value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Noussair, C; Silver, J
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner-pay auction. Bidders' decisions move closer to equilibriu...
