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作者：Pecorino, Paul
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for consumption also increases. This raises the mar...
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作者：Chan, William; Courty, Pascal; Hao, Li
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; European University Institute; University of Toronto
摘要：In a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants' efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we ...
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作者：Chaudhuri, Ananish; Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry
作者单位：University of Auckland; New York University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordinat...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility frontier. They generate multiple equilibria: co...
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作者：Dolado, Juan J.; Jansen, Marcel; Jimeno, Juan F.
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This article examines the effects of transitory skill mismatch in a matching model with heterogeneous jobs and workers. In our model, some highly-educated workers may accept unskilled jobs for which they are over-qualified but are allowed to engage in on-the-job search in pursuit of a better job. We show that this feature has relevant implications for the set of potential equilibria, the unemployment rates of the different types of workers, the degree of wage inequality, and the response of th...
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作者：Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg
摘要：Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this article I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through tel...
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作者：Branch, William A.; Carlson, John; Evans, George W.; McGough, Bruce
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of Oregon
摘要：This article considers the interaction of optimal monetary policy and agents' beliefs. We assume that agents choose their information acquisition rate by minimising a loss function that depends on expected forecast errors and information costs. Endogenous inattention is a Nash equilibrium in the information processing rate. Although a decline of policy activism directly increases output volatility, it indirectly anchors expectations, which decreases output volatility. If the indirect effect do...
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作者：Bhaskar, V.
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision ( bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. I use these 'randomised trials' to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences and the effects of these choices upon the outcomes in the game. I find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are often poorly made and reduce the probability of the...
