SUSPENSE: DYNAMIC INCENTIVES IN SPORTS CONTESTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, William; Courty, Pascal; Hao, Li
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; European University Institute; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02204.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 24-46
• 关键词: tournaments; provision

摘要

In a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants' efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of incentive schemes.