DECEPTION THROUGH TELLING THE TRUTH?! EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUALS AND TEAMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02205.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 47-60
• 关键词: guessing games; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this article I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions.