TALKING OURSELVES TO EFFICIENCY: COORDINATION IN INTER-GENERATIONAL MINIMUM EFFORT GAMES WITH PRIVATE, ALMOST COMMON AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF ADVICE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chaudhuri, Ananish; Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry
• 署名单位: University of Auckland; New York University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02207.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 91-122
• 关键词: pre-play communication; overlapping generations; BEHAVIOR; equilibrium

摘要

We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.