RATIONAL ADVERSARIES? EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMISED TRIALS IN ONE DAY CRICKET

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhaskar, V.
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02203.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1-23
• 关键词: strategy; play

摘要

In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision ( bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. I use these 'randomised trials' to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences and the effects of these choices upon the outcomes in the game. I find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are often poorly made and reduce the probability of the team winning, a particularly surprising finding given the intensely competitive environment and opportunities for learning.