Brothers in arms - An experiment on the alliance puzzle

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
• 署名单位: Sun Yat Sen University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.011
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 61-76
• 关键词: Alliance; CONFLICT; Contest; free-riding; hold-up problem; In-group solidarity

摘要

The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former 'brothers in arms' fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize the joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share the spoils of victory equally and peacefully. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.