On games of strategic experimentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosenberg, Dinah; Salomon, Antoine; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Universite Paris 13
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 31-51
• 关键词: Strategic experimentation; optimal stopping; Real options; incomplete information

摘要

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are observed, and on the correlation between the two individual bandit problems. When experimentation outcomes are public, the game is basically one of strategic complementarities. When experimentation decisions are public, but outcomes are private, the strategic interaction is more complex. We fully characterize the equilibrium behavior in both informational setups, leading to a clear comparison between the two. In particular, equilibrium payoffs are higher when equilibrium outcomes are public. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.