Information sharing between vertical hierarchies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piccolo, Salvatore; Pagnozzi, Marco
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Naples Federico II
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 201-222
• 关键词: communication; information sharing; adverse selection; Vertical hierarchies

摘要

When do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents' strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information. We show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents' information. With small externalities, principals share information when externalities and correlation have opposite signs, and do not share information when externalities and correlation have the same sign. In this second case, principals face a prisoners' dilemma since they obtain higher profits by sharing information. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.