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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Southern Methodist University
摘要：Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. In a duopoly where firms may disclose quality before setting prices and prices may signal quality, non-disclosure by all firms may often be the unique symmetric outcome even if disclosure cost vanishes. A high-quality firm may not disclose even if it has strong competitive advantage over a low-quality rival. This provides an alternativ...
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作者：Gong, Erick
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：Using a study that randomly assigns HIV testing in two sites in sub-Saharan Africa, I examine the effects of testing on sexual behaviour. Using sexually transmitted infections as markers of risky sex, I find behavioural responses to HIV tests when tests provide unexpected information. Individuals surprised by an HIV-positive (HIV-negative) test increase (decrease) their risky sexual behaviour. I simulate the effects of testing and find under certain conditions, new HIV infections increase when...
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作者：Teranishi, Yuki
作者单位：Keio University
摘要：I investigate a new source of economic stickiness: namely, staggered loan interest rate contracts under monopolistic competition. This study introduces this mechanism into a standard new Keynesian model. Simulations show that a response to a financial shock is greatly amplified by the staggered loan contracts, although a response to a productivity, cost-push or monetary policy shock is not much affected. I derive an approximated loss function and analyse optimal monetary policy. Unlike other m...
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作者：Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conduct a real-effort experiment where participants choose between individual compensation and team-based pay. In contrast to tournaments, we find that women choose team-based pay at least as frequently as men in all our conditions and significantly more often in a well-defined subset of conditions. Women's greater attraction to co-operative incentives results in part from their more optimistic assessments of their prospective teammate's ability. Women also respond differently to alternativ...
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作者：Courtemanche, Charles; Heutel, Garth; McAlvanah, Patrick
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro
摘要：This article explores the relationship between time preferences, economic incentives and body mass index (BMI). We provide evidence of an interaction effect between time preference and food prices, with cheaper food leading to the largest weight gains among those exhibiting the most impatience. The interaction of changing economic incentives with heterogeneous discounting may help explain why increases in BMI have been concentrated amongst the distribution's right tail. We also model time-inco...
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作者：Caplin, Andrew; Martin, Daniel
作者单位：New York University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We provide a characterisation of choice behaviour generated by a Bayesian expected utility maximiser. The observable signature of this standard model is the impossibility of raising utility by switching wholesale from one action to another. We provide applications to robustness, to the recovery of utility from choice data and to model classification.
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作者：Conlon, John R.
作者单位：University of Mississippi
摘要：Anti-bubble policy is examined in a finite-horizon greater fool' bubble model, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short-sales constraints. This permits the use of standard tools of welfare economics to analyse bubble policies. Policy is modelled as deflating overpriced assets by revealing information about this overpricing. If the central bank is following such a policy, then the market interprets inaction as an implicit endorsement of asset prices, which raises these prices. Als...
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作者：Clark, Gregory; Cummins, Neil
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article uses a panel of 18,869 people with rare surnames whose wealth is observed at death in England and Wales 1858-2012 to measure the intergenerational elasticity of wealth over five generations. We show, using rare surnames to track families, that wealth is much more persistent than standard one generation estimates would suggest. There is still a significant correlation between the wealth of families five generations apart. We show that this finding can be reconciled with standard es...
