SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS BURST BUBBLES? SOME MICROECONOMIC ISSUES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conlon, John R.
• 署名单位: University of Mississippi
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12154
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 141-161
• 关键词: short-sale constraints; asset prices; stock-market; INFORMATION; KNOWLEDGE; expectations; uncertainty; movements; robust; crash

摘要

Anti-bubble policy is examined in a finite-horizon greater fool' bubble model, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short-sales constraints. This permits the use of standard tools of welfare economics to analyse bubble policies. Policy is modelled as deflating overpriced assets by revealing information about this overpricing. If the central bank is following such a policy, then the market interprets inaction as an implicit endorsement of asset prices, which raises these prices. Also, the central bank can deflate overpriced assets even if it has no informational advantage over any investors about this overpricing. However, unless it has such an informational advantage, a bubble-bursting rule may only make things worse.