COMPETITION, DISCLOSURE AND SIGNALLING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Southern Methodist University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12110
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 86-114
• 关键词: advertising signals; quality disclosure; products-liability; INFORMATION; price; choices; LAWS

摘要

Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. In a duopoly where firms may disclose quality before setting prices and prices may signal quality, non-disclosure by all firms may often be the unique symmetric outcome even if disclosure cost vanishes. A high-quality firm may not disclose even if it has strong competitive advantage over a low-quality rival. This provides an alternative explanation of infrequent voluntary disclosure. Although product information is always communicated whether or not firms disclose, signalling distortions may provide a rationale for mandatory disclosure regulation.