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作者：Gomes, Pedro
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions to determine the optimal public sector wage policy. Public sector wages are crucial in achieving efficient allocation of jobs. High wages induce too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, in turn raising unemployment. The optimal wage depends on the frictions in the two sectors. Following technology shocks, public sector wages should be pro-cyclical and deviations from the optimal policy signifi...
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作者：Harrod, R. F.
作者单位：University of Oxford
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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes
作者单位：University of Rochester; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Zurich
摘要：The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmstrom, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise.
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作者：Dunlop, John T.
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作者：Pinotti, Paolo
作者单位：Bocconi University
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作者：Oliveros, Santiago; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：University of Essex; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; International Monetary Fund
摘要：Political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into information cocoons' and segregate along ideological lines. We show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates cross-over' in news consumption: voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist. This non-monotonicity in the demand for slant makes voters' i...
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作者：Rendahl, Pontus
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Solving dynamic models with inequality constraints poses a challenging problem for two major reasons: dynamic programming techniques are reliable but often slow, whereas Euler equation-based methods are faster but have problematic or unknown convergence properties. This study attempts to bridge this gap. I show that a common iterative procedure on the first-order conditions - usually referred to as time iteration - delivers a sequence of approximate policy functions that converges to the true ...
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作者：Nordhaus, William D.
作者单位：Yale University
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Southern Methodist University
摘要：Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. In a duopoly where firms may disclose quality before setting prices and prices may signal quality, non-disclosure by all firms may often be the unique symmetric outcome even if disclosure cost vanishes. A high-quality firm may not disclose even if it has strong competitive advantage over a low-quality rival. This provides an alternativ...
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作者：Wang, Tianxi
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This study examines the causal effects of bank size on banks' survival, asset quality and leverage. Two forces drive these effects: increasing returns to scale derived from banks' expertise and competition. The first enables bigger banks to survive competition better, have higher asset quality and be more leveraged. It drives banks into a race for expansion. This race toughens competition between banks, which edges out small banks and may worsen all banks' asset quality. Consequently, the bank...
