ARE WOMEN MORE ATTRACTED TO CO-OPERATION THAN MEN?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie Claire
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12122
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 115-140
• 关键词: gender-differences; team competition; incentives; performance; field; PRODUCTIVITY; preferences; matrilineal; aversion; IMPACT

摘要

We conduct a real-effort experiment where participants choose between individual compensation and team-based pay. In contrast to tournaments, we find that women choose team-based pay at least as frequently as men in all our conditions and significantly more often in a well-defined subset of conditions. Women's greater attraction to co-operative incentives results in part from their more optimistic assessments of their prospective teammate's ability. Women also respond differently to alternative rules for team formation in a manner that is consistent with advantageous inequity aversion. In contrast, men show a greater responsiveness to efficiency gains associated with team production.