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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes
作者单位：University of Rochester; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Zurich
摘要：The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmstrom, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise.
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作者：Guriev, Sergei; Klimenko, Mikhail
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Saint Petersburg State University
摘要：We use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to show that time structure of trade agreements is related to the characteristics of trade-facilitating investments. If these investments are specialised to trade in a particular homogeneous good, fixed-term agreements are more likely. Fixed-term agreements provide incentives for the initial investment but leave the parties the flexibility to revisit the need for future investment. If the agreement covers trade in multiple sectors or differentiated...
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作者：Pencavel, John
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Observations on munition workers, most of them women, are organised to examine the relationship between their output and their working hours. The relationship is non-linear: below an hour's threshold, output is proportional to hours; above a threshold, output rises at a decreasing rate as hours increase. Implications of this finding for the estimation of labour supply functions are considered. The findings also link up with the current research on the effects of long working hours on accidents...
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作者：Breda, Thomas
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article identifies the wage premium associated with firm-level union recognition in France. An average premium of 2% is found despite the fact that most workers are already covered by industry-level agreements. To explore the origin of the premium, I construct a simple bargaining model from which I derive three predictions, which are tested empirically using matched employer-employee data. The main prediction is that if intra-firm bargaining is behind the union wage premium, the latter in...
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作者：Nakaguma, Marcos Yamada
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：This article proposes a model to study the main factors that influence the preferences of different population groups between presidential and parliamentary systems. Ceteris paribus, the poor groups in the population tend to prefer a presidential system relatively more than the rich, as the lower quality of their local accountability institutions (e.g. local media and judicial courts) makes them more vulnerable to the expropriation of rents by their legislators. The model is able to account fo...
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作者：Brueckner, Markus; Schwandt, Hannes
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Princeton University
摘要：Do populations grow as countries become richer? In this study we estimate the effects on population growth of shocks to national income that are plausibly exogenous and unlikely to be driven by technological change. For a panel of over 139 countries spanning the period 1960-2007, we interact changes in international oil prices with countries' average net-export shares of oil in GDP. Controlling for country and time fixed effects, we find that this measure of oil price induced income growth is ...
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作者：Sherman, Joshua; Weiss, Avi
作者单位：University of Vienna; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We compare predictions from a theoretical model based on the structure of the main outdoor retail market in Jerusalem with the results of an empirical analysis of price response to changes in cost. We find that firms without adjacent competition exhibit both upward and downward price rigidity, an outcome we ascribe to asymmetric information between the consumer and the firm. Given that previous studies have focused on downward price rigidities of firms with market power, our findings highlight...
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作者：Gordon, Sidartha; Riboni, Alessandro
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We consider a conflict under incomplete information where two opponents fight to impose their preferred policy. Before the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. Under some conditions, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent: the agent never doubts the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent, and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under other conditions, the agent believes that his opponent may be right, even when all ...
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作者：Trautmann, Stefan T.; van de Kuilen, Gijs
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Tilburg University
摘要：We pit non-incentivised introspection against five revealed preference mechanisms ('truth serums') in the elicitation of beliefs in a simple two-player game. We measure the additivity, the predictive power for own behaviour and the accuracy of each method. Beliefs from incentivised methods are better predictors of participants' own behaviour compared to introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of accuracy and additivity. We also find that correct...
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作者：Ooghe, Erwin; Peichl, Andreas
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Mannheim; KU Leuven; KU Leuven; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Mannheim
摘要：We study fair and efficient tax-benefit schemes based on income and non-income factors under partial control. Partial control means that each factor is a specific mixture of unobserved ability (randomly drawn by nature) and effort (chosen by individuals who differ in tastes). Factors differ in the degree of control, ranging from no control (only ability matters) to full control (only effort matters). Fairness requires compensating individuals for differences in abilities but not for difference...
