BELIEF ELICITATION: A HORSE RACE AMONG TRUTH SERUMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Trautmann, Stefan T.; van de Kuilen, Gijs
• 署名单位: Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12160
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2116-2135
• 关键词: proper scoring rules; subjective probabilities; strategic uncertainty; developing-countries; social preferences; stated beliefs; expectations; incentives; MARKETS; CHOICE

摘要

We pit non-incentivised introspection against five revealed preference mechanisms ('truth serums') in the elicitation of beliefs in a simple two-player game. We measure the additivity, the predictive power for own behaviour and the accuracy of each method. Beliefs from incentivised methods are better predictors of participants' own behaviour compared to introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of accuracy and additivity. We also find that correction for risk aversion improves the additivity of scoring rule belief reports.