BELIEF PRECISION AND EFFORT INCENTIVES IN PROMOTION CONTESTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12162
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1952-1963
• 关键词: Career concerns; INFORMATION; tournaments; reputation; ECONOMICS

摘要

The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmstrom, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise.