FIRMS' RENTS, WORKERS' BARGAINING POWER AND THE UNION WAGE PREMIUM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Breda, Thomas
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12198
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1616-1652
• 关键词: Efficiency; impacts; profits; capture; density

摘要

This article identifies the wage premium associated with firm-level union recognition in France. An average premium of 2% is found despite the fact that most workers are already covered by industry-level agreements. To explore the origin of the premium, I construct a simple bargaining model from which I derive three predictions, which are tested empirically using matched employer-employee data. The main prediction is that if intra-firm bargaining is behind the union wage premium, the latter increases with the amount of quasi-rents available in the firms that unions organise. This prediction is validated empirically when firms' market shares are used as a proxy for their rents.