Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ichihashi, Shota
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.006
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 276-288
• 关键词: Information disclosure; Bayesian persuasion; information design

摘要

I study how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on Sender's information. I consider a game in which, prior to Sender's information disclosure, Designer can restrict the most informative signal that Sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of Designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I derive an information restriction that maximizes Receiver's payoffs: Whenever Designer can increase Receiver's payoffs by restricting Sender's information, the Receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of a hypothetical game in which Receiver persuades Sender. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.