Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moldovanu, Benny; Rosar, Frank
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.011
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 85-108
• 关键词: Dynamic voting; Irreversible option; option value; Supermajority rules; Voting by two-sided supermajority

摘要

A large polarized electorate decides repeatedly between a reversible alternative (REMAIN) and an irreversible alternative (LEAVE) in an environment where the aggregate short-term effects of the decision vary from period to period. Decisions by simple majority or by a too low supermajority may perform poorly under circumstances where it is socially optimal to never LEAVE, as they can exhibit equilibria where LEAVE is chosen quickly. In general, a too low supermajority rule can have much higher welfare costs than a too high supermajority rule. If REMAIN also becomes permanent when it wins by a large enough margin, and if a new vote is triggered otherwise, particularly poor performances of the simple majority rule are avoided. The large asymmetry in potential welfare costs disappears, and the majority requirement becomes a relatively less important instrument. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.