General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frongillo, Rafael M.; Kash, Ian A.
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.010
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 636-662
• 关键词: Information elicitation; mechanism design; Proper scoring rules; Implementability characterizations; Property elicitation; convex analysis

摘要

We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding characterizations for all of these settings. This includes a new characterization of scoring rules for non-convex sets of distributions. We combine the characterization theorem with duality to give a simple construction to convert between scoring rules and randomized mechanisms. We also show how a generalization of this characterization gives a new proof of a mechanism design result due to Saks and Yu. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.